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SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE IN JAPAN: 
A PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 20 
AND 89 OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 
Andrew B. Van Winkle† 
Abstract: Article 20 of Japan’s Constitution establishes freedom of religion.  To 
protect this freedom, the provisions of Articles 20 and 89 separate religion from the state 
to prevent the return of State Shintō.  Despite this separation, the Japanese Supreme 
Court has consistently upheld instances where state entities interact with religious groups.  
These decisions have raised the ire of numerous academics and legal professionals in and 
out of Japan who believe that Japan’s constitutional separation requires absolute 
separation, or at least something more stringent than the Supreme Court has been willing 
to find.  Although this comment rejects the approach taken by the Supreme Court in these 
cases, it also seeks to rebut the arguments of scholars and professionals opposed to these 
decisions by reinterpreting these articles in a way that still comports with the results 
reached in these Supreme Court cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1977 Tsu City Groundbreaking case, legal scholars and 
professionals have debated Japan’s constitutional freedom of religion.  The 
Tsu City case was Japan’s first case since World War II to define religious 
freedom.1  The case required the Supreme Court to decide the degree to 
which Articles 20 and 89 of Japan’s Constitution, dealing with separation of 
religion and state, limit state entities from interacting with religious 
organizations.2  Answering this question, the Court held that these articles 
created less than absolute constraints on religious activity.3  This decision led 
to a vigorous academic debate to define the terms, context, and application 
of Articles 20 and 89.  In the decades following Tsu City, the scholarly 
debate continued, fueled by Supreme Court decisions that, in all but one 
case, reaffirmed Tsu City’s holding. 
Interestingly, this debate is radically one-sided:  almost every article 
on the topic condemns the Supreme Court’s rationale in Tsu City and 
subsequent decisions reaffirming that result.  Critics primarily complain 
about the Supreme Court’s refusal to defer to Article 20’s seemingly absolute 
language, and criticize the court for upholding what they perceive as 
                                                      
†
 J.D. candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012. 
1
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, Sho 46 (gyo-tsu) no. 69, 31(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 533, translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OF JAPAN 1970 THROUGH 1990, at 478-92 (1996) [hereinafter Tsu City]. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. at 480. 
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patently unconstitutional outcomes.  But, if this criticism is valid, and these 
decisions are repugnant to Japan’s Constitution, then why does the Supreme 
Court continue to reaffirm Tsu City? 
This comment seeks to answer this question and rebut the prevailing 
academic view through a reinterpretation of Articles 20 and 89.  In 
reinterpreting Japan’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion 
through the separation of religion and the state, this comment examines the 
Japanese Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tsu City and its progeny, common 
Japanese principles of interpretation, the underlying purpose of Articles 20 
and 89, and current public policy considerations.  Using these sources, this 
comment argues that Japanese courts can reasonably interpret these articles 
to permit significant interaction between the state and religious groups and 
that the Constitution does not require absolute or even strict separation of 
religion and the state. 
Part II of this comment begins with a brief history of religion and state 
in Japan, which frames the current debate, before introducing the text of 
Articles 20 and 89.  Part III first reviews the Japanese Supreme Court cases 
that interpret these articles, and then discusses various academic and 
Supreme Court interpretations and the problems that arise from those 
interpretations.  Part IV reassesses Articles 20 and 89 under prevailing 
principles of Japanese legal interpretation and offers a new test to analyze 
whether future situations violate these constitutional provisions.  Finally, 
Part V concludes with a summary of the debate, and where this new 
interpretation fits within that debate. 
II. THE LONG HISTORY OF RELIGIONS AND THE STATE IN JAPAN DIRECTLY 
INFLUENCED THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLES 20 AND 89 
Understanding this constitutional debate concerning Articles 20 and 
89 requires a brief historical overview of the Japanese state’s historical 
comingling with, and abuse of, religion.  In 538 A.D., a delegation from the 
Korean peninsula introduced Buddhism to the Yamato court, which until that 
point had adhered to the religious authority of Amaterasu (the sun-goddess) 
and her human descendants.4  In 593, Prince Shōtoku took power, unified 
Japan, and established Buddhism as the state religion.5  Buddhism, Shintō, 
and their various schools were largely tolerant, if not syncretic, until the 
middle of the thirteenth century when the monk Nichiren introduced a new 
                                                      
4
 MASAHARU ANESAKI, HISTORY OF JAPANESE RELIGION: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
SOCIAL AND MORAL LIFE OF THE NATION 32-33, 53 (1930). 
5
 Id. at 57. 
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school of Buddhist practice that scorned all other religions, for which the 
state eventually exiled him. 6   In the centuries following the end of the 
Kamakura period (1185–1333), Japan devolved into warlordism, marked by 
intense clan fighting and even outright warfare between religious sects.7  In 
1549, amid this civil war, St. Francis Xavier introduced Christianity to 
Japan, which Japan’s reunifier, Shōgun Oda Nobunaga, nominally 
embraced.8 
Christianity’s general acceptance lasted until 1615, when Shōgun 
Tokugawa Ieyasu banished the missionaries and fostered active persecution 
of Christians and Nichiren Buddhists.9  Although Buddhism continued as 
Japan’s state religion, it had become a mere tool for the government to 
maintain control.10 
When the Meiji Restoration began in 1868, another major shift 
occurred in the state’s relationship with religion.  In 1868, Shintō became the 
state religion, and the government ordered its separation from Buddhism to 
help legitimate the new ruling structure.11  This separation resulted in strict 
regulation of all religions, and Shintō priests used their new positions of 
favor to “plunder” Buddhist temples.12  Throughout the State Shintō era, a 
wave of new religions arose in Japan.  However, the government violently 
suppressed these groups, 13  despite constitutionally guaranteeing religious 
freedom.14 
After World War II, Japan transitioned into a new socio-religious 
climate, which has endured through today.  In 1945, the Allied Occupation 
quickly dismantled State Shintō and formally ended the Meiji government’s 
suppression of all other religions.  To keep the Japanese state from ever 
reviving State Shintō, the Diet 15  ratified the Articles 20 and 89, which 
protect freedom of religion and ban state support for religious organizations, 
thus framing the debate over Japanese religious freedom.16 
                                                      
6
 Id. at 194-95. 
7
 Id. at 229-39. 
8
 Id. at 241, 244. 
9
 Id. at 250-53. 
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 Id. at 260. 
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 HELEN HARDACRE, SHINTŌ AND THE STATE 1868-1988, at 27-28 (1989). 
12
 Id. at 28-29. 
13
 Id. at 126-28. 
14
 See DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 28, available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html#s2. 
15
 The Diet is the name of Japan’s national legislative body. 
16
 See NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION].  “Kenpō” is the Japanese word for 
“constitution.”  This comment uses the English translations of the Japanese Constitution published by the 
Japanese Attorney General’s Office and the National Diet Library.  See ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S OFFICE, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL LAWS (1951); The Constitution of Japan, NATIONAL DIET 
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Japan’s current Constitution contains two articles that affect religions:  
Articles 20 and 89.  Chapter III of the Constitution, setting forth the “Rights 
and Duties of the People,” contains Article 20,17 which provides 
1) Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all.  No religious 
organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor 
exercise any political authority. 
2) No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious 
act, celebration, rite or practice. 
3) The State and its organs shall refrain from religious 
education or any other religious activity.18 
On its face, Article 20 appears to guarantee absolute freedom of 
religion by not setting forth any exceptions to that right; the repeated use of 
the word translated as “shall” is usually read as an absolute obligatory 
requirement.  This unwavering obligation receives further support from the 
Article’s prohibitive language, “shall refrain,” which takes power away from 
the state. 
Article 89 is found within Chapter VII of the Japanese Constitution, 
the chapter on “Finance.”19  Article 89 has two parts:  
1) No public money or other property shall be expended or 
appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious 
institution or association, or  
2) for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not 
under the control of public authority.20 
Article 89 limits the government’s power to expend funds on religious 
and other non-governmental entities.21  Although the article distinguishes 
religious organizations in 89(1) from all other non-governmental 
organizations in 89(2), the article nonetheless equally prohibits the 
government from expending public funds for both of these types of groups. 
                                                                                                                                                              
LIBRARY, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (based on the 
English Edition by the Government Printing Bureau). 
17
 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], ch. III. 
18
 Id. art. 20. 
19
 Id. art. 89.  
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. 
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III. THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT HAS FAILED TO OFFER A WORKABLE 
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 20 AND 89 
Beginning with the 1977 Tsu City case, this Part will review the facts 
of these cases and the Supreme Court’s rationale for each resulting decision, 
and will then discuss the prevailing academic critiques of these cases. 
A. The Japanese Supreme Court Cases Defining Articles 20 and 89 
Permit Significant Interaction Between Religions and State 
Over the past forty years, the Japanese Supreme Court has decided 
only a handful of cases concerning the separation of religions from the 
state.22  All of these cases stemmed from complaints of unconstitutional 
interaction between the state and the Shintō religion.  In all but two cases, 
the Supreme Court has upheld the challenged state action.   
1. The Tsu City Groundbreaking Case Established the Purpose and 
Effects Test Used by Japanese Courts in Cases Involving Articles 20 
and 89 
The controversy in this case began when the mayor of Tsu City spent 
public funds on a Shintō purification ceremony at the groundbreaking for a 
new city gymnasium.23  Disagreeing with this expenditure, one of the city’s 
councilmembers sued the mayor.24  The city councilman alleged that the 
expenditure violated Articles 20 and 89 because Article 20 establishes 
freedom of religion and separates religion and state, and Article 89 forbids, 
inter alia, the use of public funds to benefit religious organizations.25  Given 
the articles’ broad reach, the mayor’s payment to a religious organization to 
perform a ceremony at a public event appeared to violate the Constitution.  
Nominally, the Supreme Court agreed that Articles 20 and 89 embody 
the ideal of total separation of all religions and the state.26  However, the 
Court also found this ideal unachievable because state regulation will 
                                                      
22
 For cases on the freedom of religion as opposed to the separation of religion and state, see Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 15, 1963, Sho 36 (a) no. 485, 17(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ 
[KEISHŪ] 302 (the Criminal Exorcism case); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2000, Hei 10 (o) no. 1081, 
54 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 582 (the Jehovah’s Witness Blood Transfusion case); 
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 30, 1996, Hei 8 (ku) no. 8, 50(1) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 199 (the Aum Shinrikyō Dissolution case); and Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 8, 1996, Hei 7 
(gyo-tsu) no. 74, 50(3) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 469 (the Jehovah’s Witness School 
Kendō case). 
23
 Tsu City, supra note 1, at 479. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id.  
26
 Id. at 480. 
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inevitably interfere with a religion’s beliefs or practices in certain 
circumstances. 27   More importantly, the Supreme Court stated that total 
separation is undesirable because it would force the state to end current 
programs that involve religious groups, such as those providing financial 
assistance to private religious schools and state assistance for preserving 
historic architecture owned by religious groups.28  The Court pointed out that 
such total separation would ironically come full circle in that denial of “such 
subsidies would impose a disadvantage on these entities simply because of 
their religious nature and would inevitably result in invidious discrimination 
because of religion.”  For this reason, the Court concluded that total 
separation is impractical and possibly unconstitutional.29  
Proceeding from the premise that total separation is undesirable, the 
Court next tried to reach a balanced, middle ground through the “purpose 
and effects” test.30  The purpose and effects test requires state neutrality and 
“prohibit[s] conduct which leads to collusion between the state and a 
religion,” but “only when such activity exceeds reasonable bounds as 
determined with reference to the conduct’s purpose and effects.”31 
The Court introduced the purpose and effects test to explain that the 
government violates Article 20(3), which prohibits the state from engaging 
in religious activity, when state action 
exceeds reasonable limits and which has as its purpose some 
religious meaning, or the effect of which is to promote, 
subsidize, or conversely, to interfere with or oppose 
religion . . . .  [It is not enough that the procedure of the activity 
is] set by religion.  The place of conduct, the average person’s 
reaction to it, the actor’s purpose in holding the ceremony, the 
existence and extent of religious significance, and the effect on 
the average person, are all circumstances that should be 
considered to reach an objective judgment based on socially 
accepted ideas.32 
Under this interpretation, the state cannot violate Article 20(3) just by 
engaging in objectively religious activity; a court must also find that the 
public subjectively considers the activity religious in nature.33  Notably, the 
                                                      
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id.  Presumably, the Court would find such discrimination to be a violation of the freedom of 
religion. 
30
 Id. at 480-81. 
31
 Id. at 481. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Id. at 481-82. 
MARCH 2012 SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE IN JAPAN 369 
 
purpose and effects test only applies to violations of paragraph (3) of Article 
20, not to violations of paragraphs (1) and (2).34 
The Tsu City Court then applied this framework, finding that inviting 
and funding the ceremony did not violate Article 20(3) because the 
ceremony did not 
raise the religious consciousness of those attending or of people 
in general or lead in any way to the encouragement or 
promotion of Shintō . . . .  It is absolutely inconceivable that 
such a practice threatens to lead to the development of a special 
relationship between the State and Shintō, or the 
reestablishment of Shintō as a State religion . . . .  It will not 
have the effect of promoting or encouraging Shintō or of 
oppressing or interfering with other religions.  It therefore 
should not be considered . . . prohibited by Article 20, 
paragraph 3.35 
Simply put, the Court held that the state can constitutionally hold a religious 
ceremony so long as the ceremony does not have the obvious effect of 
promoting a particular religion or impairing religious freedom. 
Although the Court’s judgment reversed in favor of the state, it did not 
do so unanimously.  The dissent primarily looked to the purpose of Articles 
20 and 89—preventing the return of State Shintō.36  Because these articles 
serve a grave purpose, the dissent argued, the Court can only truly uphold 
these articles’ purpose by interpreting them to require absolute separation.37  
The dissent’s arguments remain important because they augment the 
criticisms lodged by many of the debate’s commentators. 
2. The Self-Defense Forces Enshrinement Case Reaffirmed the Supreme 
Court’s Lenient Purpose and Effects Test 
Almost two decades after deciding Tsu City, the Supreme Court once 
again reviewed Articles 20 and 89 in the Self-Defense Forces (“SDF”) 
Enshrinement case, 38  largely reaffirming Tsu City’s rationale.  The SDF 
Enshrinement case had its origins in 1968, when Yasuko Nakaya’s husband 
                                                      
34
 Id. (noting that “the two paragraphs differ in purpose, intent, and scope, and they guarantee 
different freedoms”). 
35
 Id. at 482. 
36
 Id. at 483-84. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1988, Sho 57 (o) no. 902, 42(5) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 277, translated in LAWRENCE W. BEER & HIROSHI ITOH, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
OF JAPAN 1970 THROUGH 1990, 492-516 (1996) [hereinafter SDF Enshrinement].   
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died in a traffic accident while on duty as a member of the SDF.39  In the 
years following this accident, a group called the SDF Friendship Association 
(“SDF Friends”), a private support group, sought to have Mr. Nakaya and 
other fallen SDF members enshrined (goshi) at the Yamaguchi Shintō 
Gokoku, a Shintō shrine for war dead.40  When the shrine denied the request 
to enshrine these deceased SDF members, SDF Friends sought assistance 
from the SDF Yamaguchi Regional Liaison Office, the government’s local 
SDF office.41  The SDF Regional Office facilitated SDF Friends’ subsequent 
petition for enshrinement by providing guidance and general assistance to 
SDF Friends when they submitted their second petition.42 
When the second petition succeeded, SDF Friends informed Mrs. 
Nakaya of her husband’s soon-to-be enshrinement by inviting her to the 
enshrinement ceremony.43   Mrs. Nakaya, a Christian, believed that SDF 
Friends violated her freedom of religion by enshrining her husband without 
her consent; she then chose to sue for rescission of the enshrinement and 
damages from SDF Friends.44  Although SDF Friends was not a government 
actor, the lower courts ruled for Mrs. Nakaya and held that the regional SDF 
office’s aid to the SDF Friends was an unconstitutional religious activity by 
a government actor.45 
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court viewed this case as one of 
competing religious beliefs rather than state engagement in religious activity.  
The Court noted that in life, Mr. Nakaya had held no known religious 
beliefs.46  However, Mrs. Nakaya did hold a Buddhist memorial service to 
appease Mr. Nakaya’s father, and subsequently held a Christian memorial 
service according to her own religious beliefs. 47   When Mrs. Nakaya 
vocalized her disapproval to SDF Friends, Mr. Nakaya’s father wrote a letter 
that requested the enshrinement proceed because he wanted to see his son 
enshrined.48  In addition to these two, with their competing religious beliefs, 
the Court identified a third interested and competing party—the shrine. 
For Mrs. Nakaya’s claim to succeed under Tsu City’s purpose and 
effects test, the Court had to find an impermissible government action in 
violation of the procedural guarantee of freedom of religion provided by 
                                                      
39
 Id. at 492. 
40
 Id. 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. 
43
 Id. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. at 498. 
46
 Id. at 496.  
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. at 509.  
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Article 20(3).  The Court first decided whether the defendants had violated 
the constitutional separation of religion.  It determined that the purpose and 
effect of the regional office’s assistance was to raise the morale of SDF 
members and their families; this was not a religious purpose and thus not a 
religious activity.49 
Although the Court could have ended its analysis there, having found 
no religious activity, it continued.  Relying on Article 20(3) as an indirect 
procedural guarantee, the Court held that Mrs. Nakaya had no individual 
cause of action unless the state violated the substantive rights contained in 
Article 20(1) or (2).50  This diverged from Tsu City by turning Article 20(1) 
into a directly enforceable right. 
After determining that government action to improve troop morale 
was permissible under Article 20(3), the Court turned to Mrs. Nakaya’s 
claim that the shrine had violated her substantive rights under Article 20(1).  
The Court denied Mrs. Nakaya’s claim by finding that the shrine was an 
interested third party with the same religious freedoms as Mr. Nakaya’s wife 
and father.51  The Court then ruled that it could not sustain Mrs. Nakaya’s 
claim for injunctive relief and damages because to do so would in turn 
violate the shrine’s religious freedom.52  This means that a person cannot 
violate Article 20(1) (guaranteeing freedom of religion) when the challenged 
action also represents an exercise of religious freedom.  In such instances, 
freedom of religion requires tolerance for the religious activities of others 
“as long as such acts do not disturb his or her freedom of religion by way of 
compulsion or disadvantaging the individual,” which would directly violate 
Article 20(2).53 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Article 20(3) and 20(1) left 
Article 20(2) as the only provision of Article 20 still available for sustaining 
Mrs. Nakaya’s claim.  Under Article 20(2), the Court found that the 
defendants did not violate the provision because they did not compel her to 
attend the ceremonies and did not restrict her from remembering her 
husband in a Christian way.54  As explained in Tsu City, a person cannot 
violate Article 20(2) without an outward act that has the effect of preventing 
a person from independently exercising his or her beliefs.  As a result, the 
Court denied all relief to Mrs. Nakaya under any provision of Article 20 
because 1) the enshrinement did not prevent Mrs. Nakaya from exercising 
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 Id. at 500. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 501. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
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her own religious beliefs, 2) no government action took place, and 3) 
competing religious beliefs require tolerance. 
The dissent chastised the majority for its interpretation of Article 
20(1) and 20(3).  Regarding Article 20(3), the dissent would have added a 
third factor to the purpose and effects test by analyzing the degree of 
government entanglement.55  The dissent also argued that the Regional SDF 
office violated Article 20(1) when it took positive actions to facilitate the 
SDF Friends’ subsequent application process to the Shintō shrine.56  The 
dissent believed this act had the effect of promoting Shintō over other 
religions; thus, this action violated Article 20(1)’s prohibition on religions 
receiving state privileges.57  The dissenting justices also disapproved of the 
fact that the Regional Office only considered Shintō enshrinement and did 
not consider obtaining recognition from other religions.58  These are valid 
criticisms that the Supreme Court has yet to address.59 
3. In the Ehime Prefecture Case, the Supreme Court, for the First Time, 
Found a Violation of the Separation of Religion and State 
The Ehime Prefecture case60  remains the only instance where the 
Court truly ruled against the state in finding a violation of Japan’s 
constitutional separation of religion and state. 61   In this case, Ehime 
Prefecture had allocated public funds for offerings to Yasukuni Shrine and to 
Gokoku Shrine to perform Shintō ceremonies.62  The plaintiffs challenged 
cash donations (tamagushiryo) for various seasonal festivals (reitaisai) and 
another type of cash donation (kumotsuryo) for memorial ceremonies 
(ireitaisai).63  Challenging these donations, a group of citizens launched a 
taxpayer suit against the former governor and other officials to repay the 
prefecture for allegedly violating Articles 20(3) and 89.64 
                                                      
55
 Id. at 514.  Together, those three factors (purpose, effects, and excessive entanglement) comprise 
the United States Supreme Court’s balancing test for separation of church and state as established in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1970). 
56
 SDF Enshrinement, supra note 38, at 515. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 See infra Part III.B. 
60
 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, Hei 4 (gyo-tsu) no. 156, 51(4) SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1673, translated in SERIES OF PROMINENT JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
UPON QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY: NOS. 27-30 1996-99, NO. 30 (1999) [hereinafter Ehime]. 
61
 In Sunagawa II, discussed infra Part III.A.6, the Court merely remanded to remedy the city’s 
unconstitutional action. 
62
 Ehime, supra note 60, at 2. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id. 
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The majority found that the Japanese government should have a 
secular nature and maintain religious neutrality because the Constitution 
created an unconditional freedom of religion.65  The majority believed that 
they could only truly prevent State Shintō’s return by requiring strict 
separation.66  Nevertheless, the majority—with a nod to the decision in Tsu 
City—accepted Article 20(3) as an indirect institutional guarantee, agreed 
that total separation was not feasible, and stated that balancing under the 
purpose and effects test was appropriate.67  
The majority then restated Tsu City’s test for impermissible religious 
activity by the state:  “activities exceeding such reasonable limits, the 
purpose of which have some religious meaning and the effect of which is to 
support, promote, or, adversely, oppose or interfere with religion, should be 
prohibited.”68  However, the Court went one step further than Tsu City by 
explicitly extending the purpose and effects test beyond Article 20(3) to 
Article 89;69 the Tsu City majority had only implied as much.70 
Thus, applying the same test from Tsu City, the Court had to 
distinguish the facts of Tsu City to explain why the offerings by Ehime 
Prefecture were improper.  The Court distinguished these cases by pointing 
out that the offerings by Ehime Prefecture to support the shrines’ highest 
ceremonies (events with extreme religious significance) went well beyond a 
minor groundbreaking ceremony (an event with little religious significance) 
from Tsu City.71 
The majority also found fault with the form of the donations.  Even 
though many citizens supported the Prefecture’s donations to mourn the 
nation’s war dead, the majority of the justices found such public requests 
inapposite because of the significance contained in tamagushiryo and 
kumotsuryo.72  The Court faulted the defendants because they had other, less 
religious, methods available to achieve the same purpose of officially 
mourning the war dead.  The Court suggested that the Prefecture could have 
made the donations as koden, an offering to families in consolation of their 
deceased, whereas tamagushiryo is a donation to support the shrine’s priests; 
the Court also suggested that the Prefecture could have used saisen, which, 
although possessing the same meaning as a tamgushiryo, is offered 
                                                      
65
 Id. at 3. 
66
 Id. at 3-4.  
67
 Id. at 4. 
68
 Id. at 4-5. 
69
 Id. at 5. 
70
 See Tsu City, supra note 1, at 492 (“[I]n light of the purpose and effects of the Groundbreaking 
Ceremony . . . it therefore does not violate Article 89 of the Constitution.”). 
71
 Ehime, supra note 60, at 6.  
72
 Id. at 6-7. 
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anonymously.73  Given these available alternatives, the Court found that the 
Prefecture’s use of tamgushiryo gave a strong impression of a special 
government relationship with Shintō to the exclusion of other religions.74  
Accordingly, the Prefecture failed to narrowly tailor its actions to achieve its 
purpose of mourning the nation’s war dead. 
Despite the majority accepting Article 20 as a conditional freedom of 
religion, concurring justices held strong to the idea of unconditional freedom 
in order to guard against the return of State Shintō. 75   These justices 
criticized the purpose and effects test because of its proven ineffectiveness to 
coherently guide lower courts.76  Instead of keeping the test, these justices 
would have held it void for vagueness.77 
Although one dissenting opinion agreed with the methodology used 
by the majority, it diverged in its application.  This dissent considered the 
Yasukuni and Gogoku shrines to have special national significance because 
they serve as monuments to the war dead, thus muting the shrines’ religious 
nature. 78   This distinction is critical because Article 20 only applies to 
religious activity; if the challenged activity is not religious, then courts do 
not need to examine the activity under the purpose and effects test. 
These dissenters essentially would have added another factor to the 
effect prong of the purpose and effects test.  Rather than ask whether the 
action created an effect that favors any one religion, the dissent would ask 
whether the effect furthered a legitimate state interest that outweighed the 
religious nature of the activity. 79   The dissent thought that because 
government officials from all religions—not just Shintō—pay official visits 
to these specific Shintō shrines, government support of these war dead 
memorials constituted a legitimate state interest.80  The dissent also argued 
that because the donations’ monetary value was small, there was less of a 
danger that the activity could be said to promote unreasonably any one 
religion over all others.81  
Another dissenting opinion strictly interpreted “religious activity” to 
prohibit only ceremonies actually performed by the state itself,82 which was 
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a factor that also arose in Tsu City.83  In that sense, this dissent argued that 
because the governor did not personally perform the ceremony, the state had 
not engaged in religious activity.  Considering Article 89, the dissent noted 
that in all practicality, the effect of donating a sum of money to a religion is 
no different than giving a tax preference based upon status as an 
incorporated religion. 84   When “religious activity” is interpreted as this 
dissent would interpret it, then it is inconsistent to hold that the government 
can give preferences to religions in one way, but not another way, even 
though both actions have the same end result.  Although many Western 
scholars may not agree with this ends-justify-the-means reasoning, it 
permeates Japanese court opinions where, in general, pragmatism reigns to 
achieve the correct ends by any reasonable means possible.85 
4. The Minō Relocation, Minō Memorial Services, and Minō Subsidy 
Cases Show that the Ehime Case Did Not Set a New Standard for 
Religious Separation Cases 
In 1976, the Kamisakas filed the first of three suits that would 
eventually make it to Japan’s Supreme Court.86  The Kamisakas alleged that 
various public officials in Minō City violated Articles 20 and 89 through 
material support for a local chukon-hi (war memorial).87  The Kamisakas 
brought the first case against the officials for their decision to pay to relocate 
the war memorial onto land owned by the school district and allow the 
memorial to use the land rent-free.88  The second case demanded the officials 
reimburse the city for the funds they had expended to hold Shintō and 
Buddhist memorial services at the monument and for the salaries paid to 
local officials who attended the services.89  The third case challenged an 
annual subsidy to the Minō Chapter of the Japan Association of War-
Bereaved Families (“Minō JAWBF”), which the Kamisakas argued was 
acting as a religious organization.90  The plaintiffs challenged the use of the 
funds by the Minō JAWBF to pay for the memorial services and visits to 
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Yasukuni Shrine. 91   The Supreme Court decided each case against the 
Kamisakas. 
In the first two cases, the Court applied the Tsu City purpose and 
effects test, but before doing so, found that the monument had lost all 
religious significance during the occupation when the Allies severed the 
monument’s formal ties to Shintō and to Yasukuni Shrine.92  The Court 
determined that the monument could not be considered an “alter ego” of 
Yasukuni just because the monument at one point had enshrined war dead 
whom priests at Yasukuni had also enshrined.93  Furthermore, the soldier 
memorial services held there alternated between Shintō and Buddhist, so that 
the monument could not be said to be an object of any one religion.94 
Because the memorial had seemingly lost all religious significance 
and also alternated between religions, the Court found that the effect of the 
local government’s action did not give any undue support or favoritism to 
one religion over another.95  The Court then absolved the public officials 
who attended the ceremonies by finding that they attended out of social 
courtesy.96 
Regarding financial assistance to the Minō JAWBF, the Court found 
that the organization served a primarily secular purpose, mooting any need 
to discuss Articles 20 and 89 in that context.97  Despite the fact that the Minō 
JAWBF used some of the city’s subsidy to sponsor trips to Yasukuni (a 
Shintō shrine), the Court found that paying to visit a religious site did not 
make the organization’s primary function religious.98  The Court supported 
this analysis by citing the fact that the national organization spent decades 
lobbying to improve pensions for veterans and that all the organization’s 
activities centered on veterans.99   Thus, the memorial services, although 
religious, had a secular purpose of honoring veterans.100 
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5. The Daijō Sai Cases101 Show the Continued Vitality of the Purpose 
and Effects Test in Japan 
Three years after the Supreme Court decided the last Minō case, the 
Court again took up separation of religion and state in two cases concerning 
Emperor Akihito’s 1989 succession ceremony.  The Third Petty Bench102 
decided the first case, a taxpayer suit against the governor and other local 
officials from Ōita Prefecture.103  The First Petty Bench, two days later, 
decided a similar case against the governor and officials from Kagoshima 
Prefecture.104 
In both of these cases, the Imperial Household Agency had invited 
local officials to attend Emperor Akihito’s succession ceremony, specifically 
the Daijō sai.105  According to Shintō practice, new emperors perform the 
Daijō sai, during which the emperor prays to the gods for peace and a 
bountiful harvest. 106   The ceremony also serves a second function, 
celebrating the emperor’s succession. 107   To attend this ceremony, the 
officials expended government funds, which the plaintiffs claimed violated 
Articles 20 and 89.108  Although the ceremony is religious, the Supreme 
Court ignored its religious nature and emphasized the ceremony’s secular 
purpose. 
Focusing on this secular purpose as the relevant purpose for the 
purpose and effects test, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ 
decisions to dismiss the suits.  The Court found that the officials attended the 
ceremony only as a celebration of Emperor Akihito as the symbol of the 
Japanese state.109  Regarding the ceremony’s effect, the Court found, without 
any discussion, that the ceremony neither promoted nor repressed any 
religion, having an essentially neutral effect on religion.110 
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6. The Sunagawa Neighborhood Association Shrine Cases111 Suggest a 
Change in the Court’s Application of the Purpose and Effects Test 
The Supreme Court decided the most recent cases involving the 
separation of religion and the state in early 2010.  The Court reviewed a pair 
of cases against Sunagawa City in northern Japan.  In both cases, Sunagawa 
City offered city-owned lands to local neighborhood associations (“NHAs”) 
without requiring compensation in return.112  In both cases, the city knew 
that the NHAs would use part of the land and buildings to house Shintō 
shrines that had already been on the land for decades.113  The city actually 
wanted to divest itself of the shrines and corresponding property because it 
thought that it needed to in order to comply with Article 89.114  The only 
other option—removing the shrines—would violate Article 20.115  Instead of 
being hailed for its attempt to comply with the constitution’s mandate, the 
city was sued by a local group of residents for the way that it divested itself 
of the shrines.116 
These cases are significant because despite having nearly identical 
facts, the Supreme Court found a violation of Article 89 in one case, but not 
the other, thereby signaling an attempt to clarify the cumbersome purpose 
and effects test.  The Supreme Court distinguished the cases based on the 
different ways that the city tried to divest itself of the shrines.  In Sunagawa 
I, the city granted the shrine land and property to the NHA.117  In Sunagawa 
II, the city entered into a contract with the NHA to loan the land for use as a 
shrine free of charge.118 
Affirming the unconstitutionality of the city’s loan in Sunagawa II, the 
Supreme Court listed several options for making the transfer that would not 
have violated Article 89:  grant, transfer for value, and lease at fair market 
value.119  Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the city’s loan contract 
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violated the Constitution, but remanded with instructions for the lower court 
to examine constitutional alternatives to removing the shrine.120 
In upholding the city’s action in Sunagawa I and condemning it in 
Sunagawa II, the Supreme Court adhered to the purpose and effects test, but 
with a new emphasis.  The Court never mentioned purpose in Sunagawa I; it 
mentioned it only briefly in Sunagawa II, and only to state that the city’s 
initial secular purpose was not sufficient to comply with the Articles 20 and 
89.121  The Court’s failure to mention the purpose prong in the first case and 
only briefly mention it in the second case appears to signal that the Court 
sees purpose as a secondary and marginal factor, compared to the effects 
factor. 
The Court put a new emphasis on the effects requirement by 
rephrasing and combining the effects criteria from the prior cases: 
Article 89 of the Constitution can be construed to prohibit the 
state’s or local public entity’s connection with religion in cases 
where its connection with religion in terms of appropriating 
public property for use, etc. is found to be beyond the limit that 
is deemed to be reasonable, in light of the social and cultural 
conditions of our country, in relation to the fundamental 
purpose of the system of securing guarantee of freedom of 
religion.122 
This test combines elements of the prior cases with its reference to social 
and cultural conditions and reasonable limits, while maintaining that the 
public’s point of view still serves as the benchmark for reasonableness.  
However, the Sunagawa II Court dropped the original effects prong, which 
asked whether the “effect of which is to promote, subsidize, or conversely, to 
interfere with or oppose religion.”123   
Further clarifying effects, the Court identified circumstances where 
state-owned religious property might not violate Article 89: 
For instance, a facility that has the nature of a religious facility 
in general terms can be, at the same time, protected as historic 
or cultural property.  Such facilit[ies] often ha[ve] other 
meanings as tourist resources, means of promoting international 
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goodwill, places where local residents cultivate mutual 
friendship, and so forth.124 
By developing these hypotheticals, the Court appeared to imply that each 
would be seen as within reasonable limits when viewed by the public.   
Although the Grand Bench unanimously decided in favor of the city 
in Sunagawa I, the Court fractured in Sunagawa II, with nine Justices either 
concurring or dissenting.  Justice Fujita presented the most important 
concurring opinion.  Although he approved of the purpose and effects test, 
he also recognized that the Court needed to address the arguments presented 
by academics and in prior dissenting opinions.125  In pointing out that the 
Court’s precedents are not “the absolute rule,” he called for a more searching 
purpose and effects test that would take a hard look at all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding alleged constitutional violations.126 
In his dissent, Justice Horigome argued that the purpose prong of the 
test merited more attention, primarily through a close examination of the 
religious nature of the action at issue.127  The concurring opinion of Justice 
Kondo outright rejected this approach as an inappropriate risk-based test.128  
Justice Tahara and Justice Kondo rejected the relaxed approach advocated by 
Justice Horigome because they viewed the constitutional separation as 
absolute. 129   Also acknowledging the inadequacy of the majority’s 
application of the law to the facts, the concurring opinion of Justices 
Kainaka, Nakagawa, Furuta, and Takeuchi advocated a closer, more 
comprehensive examination of the facts; these Justices would require a large 
trial record that includes more local history, more information regarding the 
religious entity, and facts regarding the local population’s relationship with 
the entity.130  Although Sunagawa II generated a plurality of opinions, one 
thing pulls them together:  the need for a new test to remedy the inadequacy 
of the decades-old purpose and effects test.  The rest of this comment is 
dedicated to addressing that need.  
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B. The Prevailing Academic View Accurately Critiques the Supreme 
Court’s Test, but Fails to Provide an Adequate Replacement 
As discussed in Part II of this comment, Article 20 appears to 
guarantee absolute freedom of religion by not providing any explicit 
exceptions to that freedom.  The only exceptions provided in the Article 
withhold power from the state in order to protect that religious freedom.131  
However, if Article 20 did so operate—isolated from all other laws, legal 
principles, and constitutional provisions—the Supreme Court’s results in all 
but Ehime and Sunagawa II would appear paradoxical.  Over the past 
decade, law professors from Japan, the United States, and other countries 
have leveled this criticism at the Japanese government’s approach to Article 
20, and in particular, the premise that Article 20 does not require total 
separation.132  
That premise constitutes one of the main sticking points among 
critics.  The Supreme Court in Tsu City supported its premise of limited 
separation by explaining that “an actual system of government that attempts 
a total separation of religion and the state is virtually impossible.”133  The 
dissent in Tsu City argued to the contrary that the Japanese state in fact 
needed to sever all religious ties to prevent a return to State Shintō.134 
However, the Tsu City dissent’s argument is problematic because it 
summarily dismisses the majority’s premise that absolute separation is 
impossible, and it further fails to explain how Japan can realistically achieve 
absolute separation.  Such a hard-line textualist view of Article 20(1)’s 
prohibition on any state privileges is untenable.  To achieve absolute 
separation, Japan would have to repeal the Religious Juridical Persons Law, 
because the Law contains numerous privileges conferred by the state on 
religions.135  However, such a result would go against the Diet’s intent in 
ratifying Article 20.136  Although strict separation would require repealing 
this and other laws, none of the strict separation supporters have gone so far 
as to advocate repeal.  If these critics in practice do not want to adhere to 
                                                      
131
 See supra Part II. 
132
 See, e.g., Scott M. Lenhart, Hammering Down Nails, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491 (2001); Eric 
N. Weeks, A Widow’s Might: Nakaya v. Japan and Japan’s Current State of Religious Freedom, 1995 
BYU L. REV. 691 (1995); Chun-Pin Su, The Constitutional Debates on the Yasukuni Shrine and the 
Separation of Religion and State in Japan, 2 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 1 (2007); Brent T. White, 
Reexamining Separation: The Construction of Separation of Religion and State in Post-War Japan, 22 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 29 (2004). 
133
 Tsu City, supra note 1. 
134
 Id. at 483-84.  
135
 See generally Shukyō hōjinhō [Religious Juridical Persons Law] 1995.  This statute allows 
religions, inter alia, to incorporate, receive tax benefits, and own land.  See id. 
136
 See infra Part IV.A.3.  
382 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 2 
 
strict textualism, then there must be some other reason for criticizing the 
Court’s decisions in this area. 
Rather than attacking the Court’s failure to require total separation, 
other critics accept the premise that total separation is impossible, but 
instead attack the purpose and effects test for not providing enough 
separation.  In the SDF Enshrinement case, the dissent wanted the majority 
to adopt the rest of the Lemon v. Kurtzman purpose and effects test from the 
United States Supreme Court. 137   In Lemon, the U.S. Supreme Court 
analyzed the propriety of state activities that implicate religion by asking 1) 
whether the activity had a secular purpose, 2) whether its principal or 
primary effect was one that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and 3) 
whether the activity fostered “an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”138  This third prong is what the Japanese Supreme Court left out of 
its adaptation of Lemon’s purpose and effects test.  Many academics criticize 
the Japanese test as too lenient because it does not use “excessive 
entanglement” as an additional factor for scrutinizing government action.139 
The Court’s critics also deride Japan’s purpose and effects test as 
impractical.  The concurring Justices in the Ehime case would have held the 
purpose and effects test void for vagueness, and the Justices in Sunagawa II 
agreed through their numerous critiques of the test. 140   These Justices 
pointed to numerous lower and appellate court cases where courts apply the 
test, but frequently come to conflicting results in similar cases.141  These 
empirical results strongly support these critics’ argument that the test is 
impractical. 
One significant reason for this impracticality comes from the Supreme 
Court’s tactic of deferring to the “average Japanese person” when avoiding 
judicial review of government actions.  The Court does this by basing a 
case’s outcome on a determination that “the average Japanese person is not 
offended by these [religious] practices and that the average Japanese 
[person] does not view them as religious acts.”142  The Japanese Supreme 
Court uses this determination as a condition precedent to applying the 
purpose and effects test by concluding that if the challenged activity does 
not qualify as religious, then no constitutional violation could have possibly 
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occurred.  This approach is defective because the Court has yet to define 
what circumstances would fall into the category of religious acts. 
While this comment argues that the Supreme Court reached the proper 
result in these cases, some of the critiques presented by commentators and 
dissenting Justices are compelling.  Avoiding constitutional questions by 
holding that an apparently religious activity is not religious because it is 
secular in the eyes of the people can only go so far.  At some point, the 
courts will have to hear a case where the average person finds an act 
religious and employ a more practical test to determine whether the action 
violates the Constitution.  Currently, after finding an activity is religious, the 
courts go on to apply the purpose and effects test.  However, as discussed 
above, Japanese courts have not been able to uniformly apply this test.  
Because this test has been shown to be impracticable, this comment agrees 
that Japan should abandon the purpose and effects test, but not because the 
Japanese Constitution requires strictly separating religion from the state. 
IV. FASHIONING A NEW INTERPRETATION FOR JAPAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE REQUIRES AN UNDERSTANDING 
OF JAPANESE METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION  
Having examined Japan’s religious history, the current state of the 
law, and various critiques of the law, this Part turns to Japan’s future.  
Section A reinterprets Articles 20 and 89 in light of their original intent and 
contemporary public policy considerations.  In line with this reinterpretation, 
Section B proposes a new test for deciding cases of separation of religion 
and state in Japan. 
A. Pragmatism, Purposivism, and Societal Norms Shape Japanese 
Constitutional Interpretation 
Fashioning a new test for questions arising out of Articles 20 and 89 
first requires a reinterpretation of these articles.  The following sections 
show that Japan uses many of the same interpretive methods, but often with 
less of an emphasis on text. 
1. Japan’s Interpretive Process Foremost Relies on Pragmatism, thus 
Focusing on a Law’s Purpose Over Its Text 
Japanese courts rarely rely on text alone to determine the outcome of 
sensitive cases dealing with rights and constitutional law.  In fact, Japanese 
courts occasionally bend the black letter law because Japan recognizes 
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custom and natural reason as collateral sources of law.143  Although the 
result may violate a statute, judges would rather come to a reasoned outcome 
that takes societal policies into account than take a rule to its logical and 
sometimes absurd end.144  Japanese courts essentially value substance over 
form. 
An everyday example of this occurs in Japanese marriage law.  Article 
739 of the Civil Code requires couples to register their marriages before they 
become legally effective.145  Over the years, Japanese courts have taken the 
marriage law and interpreted it to extend benefits to de facto marriages, even 
recognizing de facto divorces.146  Consequently, the courts have rendered 
statutory provisions requiring registration of a marriage with the state 
virtually unnecessary. 
An even more striking example of Japan’s belief in pragmatic 
reasoning concerns the constitutional rights of the accused.  In Hashimoto, 
the Japanese Supreme Court explicitly contradicted the plain meaning of the 
law’s text to achieve a pragmatic result.147  In that case, the Supreme Court 
interpreted Articles 31 and 35 of the Constitution.  Article 31 prohibits 
criminal penalties from being imposed except according to lawful 
procedures.148  Article 35 limits what constitutes lawful procedure when 
seizing evidence. 149   Police arrested Hashimoto; he was convicted of 
narcotics possession after a body search by police found narcotics.150  The 
police violated Hashimoto’s right to be free from illegal seizure when they 
performed the search without his consent or a reasonable apprehension of 
danger to warrant an involuntary search.151   
Despite this unlawful seizure, the Japanese Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld the prosecution’s use of the evidence at trial.152  The 
Supreme Court began its decision by admitting a constitutional violation had 
occurred because “the officer . . . seriously violated the privacy of the 
individual.  The officer’s action was an unreasonable search under the 
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circumstances . . . .  [Consequently,] the evidence must be said to have been 
seized unlawfully as part of the arrest.”153 
Nonetheless, the Court went on to base its holding on pragmatic 
principles: 
[I]n a situation in which the requisites for an official 
interrogation existed, and the necessity and the urgent 
conditions for examining the personal effects were recognized, 
and the defendant did not make a clear response as to whether 
or not he would comply with the officer’s request, the officer 
exceeded only a little the limits of the law . . . .  From the 
beginning, the officer had no intention to neglect any law or 
regulation connected with principles requiring the warrant, nor 
was there any evidence of use of physical force by the officer in 
examining the personal effects.  The evidence in this case 
should be admitted.154 
In effect, the Court weighed Hashimoto’s privacy rights against societal 
rights and expectations and determined that, in context, the officer’s actions 
did not constitute a glaring offense.155 
Furthermore, although Hashimoto had only violated narcotics 
possession laws, the Court identified other important public welfare factors 
for ensuring his confinement, including his known mafia affiliation. 156  
Hashimoto stands for the principle that pragmatic reasoning, which looks to 
the underlying purposes behind statutes, can matter more than the text used 
to achieve those purposes.  In essence, the means specified by the Diet have 
less importance than the ends that those means serve to achieve. 
2. A Purely Textual Interpretation Is Impossible Because the 
Constitution’s Ambiguous Text Does Not Fully Define the Boundaries 
of Japan’s Freedoms 
Although the text alone will not determine a case, the cases in this 
section show that Japanese courts will sometimes use canons of statutory 
interpretation when interpreting text.  As previously discussed in Part II of 
this comment, the provisions of Article 20 individually and together may 
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give readers the sense that religious freedom is absolute.157  Although this 
seems a natural reading, the term “absolute” is absent from the Article.  
Without the presence of a qualifier such as “guaranteed without exception or 
restraint” or “except as otherwise provided,” the degree of constitutionally-
guaranteed religious freedom remains ambiguous. 
When resolving these sorts of ambiguities, Japanese courts have 
looked to canons of statutory interpretation.  For example, in interpreting a 
statute that listed kisha (steam train) and densha (electric train), a court 
extended the statute to gas-powered trains by using the canon whereby items 
in a list are considered to imply the inclusion of other items in the same 
class.158  In another case, the Supreme Court applied the canon whereby the 
expression of one thing necessarily excludes all others.  The statute in that 
case prohibited public servants from supporting or opposing a particular 
candidate, but as interpreted by the Court, did not apply to a person who 
intended to be a candidate.159  However, the Court ignored that same canon 
in another case where it extended the term mono (usually understood to 
pertain to tangible things) to include electricity because humans can capture 
electricity, making non-tangible electricity tangible enough as far as the 
criminal statute was concerned.160  As these cases demonstrate, Japan may 
use canons of textual interpretation, but the courts do not always rely on 
these canons consistently.  
One interpretive rule that the Supreme Court has applied consistently 
requires reading articles of the Constitution in context of the whole; this 
holds especially true when interpreting fundamental rights in Japan.  Article 
20 appears in Chapter III, titled “Rights and Duties of the People.”  The 
reference to duties suggests that Japan views rights more as privileges, or 
qualified rights. 161   Although constitutions generally give fundamental 
human rights, such as religious freedom, more deference and fewer 
restrictions than other rights, the Japanese Constitution, through the context 
of Article 12, imposes duties that limit these rights:  
The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this 
Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of 
the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms 
                                                      
157
 See supra Part II. 
158
 See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (Hideo Tanaka 
ed., 1976) [hereinafter Tanaka]. 
159
 See id. at 104. 
160
 See id. at 106. 
161
 An example of this concept would be driving; people who obtain a driver’s license have a right to 
drive, but also have a duty to exercise that right in accordance with the rules of the road. 
MARCH 2012 SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND STATE IN JAPAN 387 
 
and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for 
the public welfare.162 
That final clause concerning the public welfare has been read to limit the 
manner in which the Japanese people can exercise all other constitutionally 
protected rights.  Japan scholars widely know this rights-versus-duties 
relationship as the public welfare doctrine.  
The Supreme Court most famously discussed the public welfare 
doctrine in the Lady Chatterley’s Lover case.163  In that case, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the criminal convictions on obscenity charges of a prominent 
novelist and a reputable publisher.  The charges stemmed from these 
individuals’ roles in the distribution and sale of a widely popular translation 
of D.H. Lawrence’s sexually-charged novel, Lady Chatterley’s Lover.164  The 
Court recognized the artistic value of the novel, as protected by Article 21’s 
guaranteed freedom of expression, but also recognized that the presence of 
artistic value does not mutually exclude obscenity.165  In extending public 
welfare as a justification for criminalizing obscenity and using it as a 
limitation on Article 21, the Court cited eight previous cases where it had 
read constitutionally-protected rights in context with Articles 12 and 13.166  
It is therefore appropriate, if not necessary, to read Article 20’s guaranteed 
freedom of religion in context with the public welfare limits outlined in 
Article 12. 
3. The Government’s Original Understanding of Articles 20 and 89 Calls 
for a Loose Interpretation, Allowing for Broad Interaction Between 
the State and Religions 
Although Article 20 contains a textual ambiguity by failing to define 
the extent of Japan’s religious freedom, the rest of the Constitution provides 
context for setting the limits on this freedom.  This context comes from 
Article 12, which defines Article 20 according to the public welfare.  
However, because the Constitution does not define public welfare, Article 20 
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cannot be fully understood without first looking outside the Constitution to 
define Article 12’s public welfare and the limits it places on rights. 
Courts may define the proper bounds of rights through legislative 
intent, which is usually contained in legislative debates or in commentary 
written by the drafters.  Typically, Japanese courts do not cite to legislative 
history, but the courts do periodically use this history to informally guide 
their decisions.167 
In examining the current Japanese Constitution, readers should keep 
in mind that the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (“SCAP”) 168 
drafted these provisions.  Article 89, as well as Article 20’s separation 
clause, did not appear in the drafting process until the United States 
submitted its February 1946 draft.169  According to Kenzō Takayanagi,170 the 
Diet adopted these provisions under a feeling of duress: 
In 1946, when I participated in the making of the present 
Constitution, I believed that it was “imposed” upon Japan . . . .  
There is no doubt that such acceptance was gained by the 
superior military force of the Allied Powers, and that such 
policy [of democratization] was “forced” upon the Japanese 
government . . . .  I was not then aware of the Moscow 
Agreement171 . . . [and] thought SCAP was entitled to impose 
any constitutional text upon Japan . . . .  I imagined also that the 
acceptance by Japan of this “imposed” Constitution might be 
one of the terms of the future peace treaty . . . .  No legislation 
was enacted by the “free will of the Japanese” in the sense that 
enactment was accomplished “without any outside 
interference.”172 
Because the Constitution is not wholly a Japanese Constitution, textual 
interpretation should not provide the only lens for analyzing its provisions.  
Instead, scholars can best understand the constitution’s text not only through 
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examining SCAP’s intent where it added certain provisions, but also through 
the ratifying Diet’s interpretation of those provisions to fit Japan’s needs.  
When SCAP drafted Articles 20 and 89, it intended to “purge” Shintō 
from the state, regardless of the results of such policy.173  As one SCAP 
draftsman stated:  “We simply wanted to separate religion from the state.  
That was all there was to it.  We were not concerned about any theories 
regarding church-state relations.”174  In other words, SCAP inserted Articles 
20 and 89 solely to eliminate Shintō as a source of ultra-nationalism that 
could hinder pacification; SCAP had no concern in drafting those provisions, 
whatsoever, for the ideals of religious freedom.  Because SCAP failed to 
consider public policy, strict reliance on the text of the separation articles is 
ill-advised without first considering what public policies will be advanced or 
hindered by separation. 
Although SCAP did not stop to consider Japan’s best interests, the 
Diet was not so short-sighted.  Looking to the policies embodied by the text 
of these articles, members in both the House of Representatives and House 
of Peers raised concerns whether Article 20(1) was an absolute freedom.175  
In addressing these concerns, Japan’s executive branch assured the Diet that 
Article 12 (public welfare) worked in conjunction with Article 20 to limit 
freedom for the public welfare.176  The government also assured the Diet that 
provisions limiting government interference with religion were not self-
executing, but would be enacted by statute and protected in the courts by due 
process. 177   This original interpretation from the Japanese government 
supports the holding in the SDF Enshrinement case that the separation 
clauses provide an institutional guarantee and not an individually 
enforceable right.178  
Japan’s history of nationalism and religious persecution may provide a 
dual framework for interpreting Article 20.  During the constitutional 
debates, Matsudaira Narimitsu of the House of Peers, in line with SCAP’s 
intent, understood every sentence after Article 20(1) as merely a mechanism 
“to prevent the government’s imposition of a particular religion that 
emphasizes ultra-nationalistic ideology.”179  However, Mr. Kanamori of the 
Japanese government understood these additional provisions as keeping the 
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state from actively or passively influencing any religion.180  Mr. Kanamori 
likely had in mind the Meiji government’s forced revision of religious 
doctrines, as happened to the religion Tenrikyō, and the baseless harassment 
of religious groups, as happened to the religions Ōmoto and Hito no 
Michi. 181   Under the government’s interpretation, Article 20 served two 
purposes:  1) to prevent the government from reestablishing a state religion, 
and 2) to prevent the government from harassing religions.  To those ends, 
Japan should limit Article 20 to provide the most flexibility for the Diet and 
the courts to consider the public welfare in addressing inevitable contacts 
between religion and government.  
Although SCAP’s purpose behind Articles 20 and 89 did not focus on 
religions, the text is impliedly for the benefit of religions.  Because these 
provisions directly impact religions, scholars should also consider what sort 
of freedom and separation Japanese religions’ adherents desired.  Religious 
leaders and Diet members alike expressed deep concern over the practical 
implications of these articles, especially Article 89.182  When the Diet ratified 
the Constitution, the Religions League of Japan (Nihon Shūkyō Remmei), 
representing Shintō, Buddhist, and Christian leaders, expressed 
dissatisfaction with Articles 20 and 89.183  Religious leaders feared that these 
articles would end all special privileges for religions, including tax 
exemptions and rent-free use of lands.184 
Addressing these concerns, the Japanese government assured the Diet 
and religious leaders that Article 89 would not take away the prior privileges 
open to all religions. 185   Regarding Article 20, the government further 
clarified that the provision requires the government to respect all religions 
equally, without emphasizing one religion to the exclusion of others. 186  
Therefore, while the text can be read to require strict separation, the Diet and 
religious groups only intended to ensure that all religions have equal 
opportunity to enjoy government privileges. 
Diet members also raised concerns regarding the Article 20(3) 
prohibition against the government directly engaging in religious activity.  
Responding to those worries, the Japanese government informed the Diet 
that “it was perfectly acceptable for public schools to offer religious 
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programs as extracurricular activities, as long as the school did not restrict 
itself to one religion.”187  The government further explained that the Ministry 
of Education would “encourage activities such as alumni groups inviting 
various religious authorities for lectures, and that [the government] saw no 
problem with the principal of the public school initiating or actively 
participating in such activities.” 188   Given the Japanese government’s 
original understanding of these provisions as narrow limitations, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Tsu City, Minō, and other religious activity 
cases do not appear out of line with the constitutional interpretation that 
government actors may support religion, as long as they do not deny other 
religions an opportunity to work with the state as well. 
4. Japan Should Define the Constitutionally-Required Degree of 
Religious Separation by Current Societal Standards Because Japanese 
Courts Recognize a “Living Constitution” 
Although narrowly tailoring Article 20’s restrictions on government 
interaction with religion comports with the Article’s legislative history, 
scholars should remember that Japan’s form of constitutionalism tempers 
any such interpretation.  Japan’s Constitution is a living Constitution;189 this 
means that what may have been constitutional at the time of drafting will not 
necessarily remain constitutional as the years pass.   
The Chatterley decision provides an excellent example of Japan’s 
belief in a living Constitution.  In the Chatterley case, the Court announced 
that the test for whether something constitutes obscenity, and thus violates 
the public welfare, is determined by “the good sense operating generally 
through the society, that is, the prevailing ideas of society.”190  However, one 
must keep in mind that what constitutes “prevailing ideas of society” is a 
judgment of law—not fact.191 
Just because judicial discretion defines the shifts in public welfare 
does not mean that Japan’s societal standards go unchanged.  In Repeta v. 
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Japan, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed a trial judge’s ruling on the 
grounds that the public welfare interests had diminished.192 
The case started when a trial judge prevented Lawrence Repeta, a 
prominent American legal scholar, from taking research notes while 
observing the judge’s trial. 193   Repeta challenged the order as an 
unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression and as inequitable as 
applied because the court allowed the press corps to take notes during the 
trial.194   
Addressing Repeta’s challenge, the Supreme Court began its opinion 
by affirming the standard that “rational restriction” (gōriteki seigen) can 
limit any freedom.195  In determining whether the restriction had a rational 
basis, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial judge’s rationale 
obsolete because present day circumstances had diminished the need for 
such public welfare restrictions: 
[T]he instant measure should be said to be an exercise of the 
courtroom policing power lacking a rational basis.  [Although 
there may have been a rational basis for restricting note-taking 
in the past, when courtroom disruption was an everyday 
occurrence,] at present we have reached the point where 
consideration for the taking of notes by spectators is lacking, 
and hereafter must recognize that concern for the taking of 
notes by spectators is demanded.196 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Repeta provides a clear indication that 
Japan’s constitutional provisions evolve as Japanese society changes.  
Although Article 20’s legislative history indicates an intent that the courts 
loosely construe its provisions, Japan’s constitutionalism requires that they 
also take into account the country’s current situation; this constitutionalism 
should hold special importance for Japan in light of the fact that SCAP 
drafted the constitution’s text.197  Thus, in terms of Article 20 and other 
constitutional rights, the Repeta case indicates that the boundaries of Japan’s 
rights, as defined by Article 12’s public welfare provisions, will change over 
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time as Japan’s people and the circumstances in which they live also 
change.198 
5. Taking Public Policy into Account, a Narrow Interpretation of the 
Prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89 Best Serves Japan’s Public Welfare 
To determine whether Japan’s current societal situation calls for 
stricter or looser interpretation of Articles 20 and 89 requires examining 
public policy considerations.  Where, as here, different constitutional 
provisions compete (that is, Articles 20 and 89 compete against Article 12), 
the Japanese Supreme Court has held that weighing public policy becomes 
all the more important.199 
Tanaka v. Nishiwaki provides a good example of this principle in 
action. 200   In limiting the inviolable right to own or to hold property, 
embodied in the letter and purpose of Article 29 of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court found that changed circumstances had made it more 
important to require land-owners to show justifiable cause before removing 
renters who have greater need for the land.201  In the spirit of Tanaka, the 
Court should place greater emphasis on examining changed circumstances 
and determining which policies would benefit from a narrow interpretation 
of the prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89. 
When SCAP drafted these articles, it feared Japanese re-militarization.  
As part of its strategy to prevent that from happening, SCAP inserted 
Articles 20 and 89.202  In the decades since the close of World War II, the 
Japanese people and their religions no longer face the threat of State Shintō, 
or of the state otherwise co-opting religion.   
Instead, the Japanese people and their state have been threatened by 
religiously-motivated violence and religions used for fraud.  On March 20, 
1995, the religion Aum Shinrikyō staged a coordinated attack on the Tokyo 
subway system; in that attack, the group released the nerve gas Sarin, killing 
thirteen people and injuring nearly a thousand more.203  Along with religious 
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extremism, Japan has also had to deal with allegations of religions 
defrauding its members.204  
In both situations, the government dealt with these threats judiciously.  
Although the government ultimately disbanded Aum Shinrikyō, “[t]he sect’s 
crimes include[d] not only a large-scale indiscriminate terrorist attack, but 
also kidnapping, drugging, homicide, the production of weapons of mass 
murder, and conspiracy to commit armed insurrection.”205  Considering these 
crimes, and the lives lost and negatively impacted because of Aum, 
disbandment and criminal prosecution were necessary to protect the public 
welfare.  Without a lenient interpretation of Article 20, the government could 
not have adequately dealt with the threat Aum presented. 
The public also vehemently called for disbanding the religion Risshō 
Koseikai after a series of scathing articles by the Yomiuri newspaper in the 
1950s.206  Although the Diet launched an investigation in response to the 
newspaper attacks, which ultimately criticized the religion, the executive 
branch, through the Ministry of Education, kept the Diet in check and 
worked with Koseikai to resolve the incident.207  In the end, Koseikai came 
out stronger than before,208 whereas in the Meiji Era, Koseikai would have 
seen its leaders arrested for lèse-majesté and been either disbanded or forced 
by the government to alter its doctrines.209 
Based on the government’s demonstrated ability to even-handedly 
balance religious freedom with the public welfare and the lack of any real 
threat of re-establishing State Shintō, there is no readily apparent policy 
justification for rigidly applying Articles 20 and 89—their original purpose 
is safely being served.  
Japan’s policy favoring broad judicial discretion also benefits from 
narrowly interpreting the prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89.  This policy 
objective explains why Japan’s Constitution contains so many vague 
provisions such as the “public welfare” provisions.  Kenzō Takayanagi210 
explained the purpose behind the current constitution’s vagueness this way: 
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To establish detailed restrictive provisions in the Constitution 
itself might result, on the one hand, in narrowing the area of 
independent discretion as expressed by the exercise of the high 
intelligence of the Supreme Court and, on the other, in 
imposing contemporary views on later generations by means of 
the Constitution itself.  It is the intent of the Constitution of 
Japan to provide elasticity, not by resorting to frequent 
constitutional revision, but by determining through the exercise 
of good sense of the Supreme Court the limitations on 
fundamental human rights in accordance with changes from 
period to period.211  
Under this framework, it makes sense that as the threat of State Shintō 
decreases over time, Articles 20 and 89 need not remain the robust 
prohibitions that their text originally embodied.  With SCAP’s original 
purpose served, these provisions now serve only to ensure that people 
remain free to exercise their religious beliefs and religious conscience.  
Strict separation no longer makes sense because, as demonstrated here, a 
government-funded ceremony or stipend does not generally prevent people 
from being able to attend worship services or otherwise exercise their 
personal beliefs. 
Without the threat of revived State Shintō, Article 20 only serves to 
protect free conscience in two very distinct forms.  One form serves to shield 
the people from legislation that would impose religious laws, such as Canon 
Law 212  or Shari‛a Law, 213  which is in no way a current threat.  More 
pressing, Article 20 serves to protect religions from the people.  Popular 
opinion in Japan distrusts religions and believes they should no longer enjoy 
tax privileges. 214   In such a political climate, there simply exists no 
compelling reason to keep the government from engaging with religious 
groups to ensure their continued freedom. 
A lack of strong policies justifying strict separation, however, does not 
necessarily mean that Japanese courts should narrowly construe the 
prohibitions in Articles 20 and 89.  There must be a legitimate public policy 
objective served by interactions between the state and religion.  As the Aum 
incident indicates, one such policy is that the government must have 
freedom to regulate religions where public safety is at stake.  Another policy 
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is to protect religion’s very existence.  To do so, the government must also 
have the freedom to afford those groups various privileges such as tax 
exemptions and the right to acquire property in the organization’s name. 
The goal of fostering civil society provides another public policy not 
yet examined, which may also serve to restore public trust in religion.215  
Japan’s religious civil society organizations provide public benefits in many 
ways, including fighting poverty, crime, and drug addiction; operating 
schools, museums, parks, and hospitals; operating homes for orphans, the 
elderly, and the handicapped; organizing efforts for community self-
improvement; and advocating social policies in legislatures and in courts.216  
Governments can, when it is done properly, directly achieve the goal of 
improving civil society by providing public funds and other financial 
benefits to civil society groups for services rendered, or through subsidies to 
provide these services to others.217  In both the United States and Japan, the 
state contributes more capital to civil society organizations than any other of 
these groups’ funding sources.218  Without government support, it is safe to 
say that many civil society organizations would no longer have the means 
necessary to operate.  So long as public funds do not come with excessive 
strings or other circumstances that hinder these organizations’ independence, 
civil society will be improved.219  
Japan, by permitting the state and religions to liberally interact, will 
become safer, will give its religions a better chance of survival, and will 
improve its society as a whole through the increase in social capital.220  
Although many benefits come from increasing religious interaction, Japan 
must still guard to prevent government discrimination against religions.  To 
address this concern, the Japanese Supreme Court should adopt a new test 
for balancing the freedom of religion with the public welfare. 
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B. A New Test: Balancing Religious Freedom with the Public Welfare 
Japanese courts, influenced by U.S. jurisprudence, frequently apply 
balancing tests to decide legal questions.221  The purpose and effects test 
discussed in this comment provides one such example.  Although this 
comment proposes abandoning that test, the Court should replace it with 
another balancing test.  Balancing is critical because every case that invokes 
Article 20 will always implicate Article 12’s public welfare doctrine.  The 
courts cannot simply leave such conflicting constitutional provisions of 
equal legal importance in conflict, but must reconcile the provisions by 
weighing the interests surrounding each article. 
As a part of this new balancing test, Japanese courts should review 
allegations of state misconduct under a rebuttable presumption of 
constitutionality.  As in any lawsuit, the plaintiffs carry the initial burden of 
proof.  As a practical matter when reviewing government action, Japanese 
courts will, and already do, impose a heightened burden to rebut Japan’s 
long-standing presumption favoring the government.  It has been argued that 
Japan’s courts do this as a matter of institutional self-preservation as a co-
equal branch of government.  In the past, the Diet has taken years to respond 
to Supreme Court decisions holding laws unconstitutional.222  Because the 
Japanese courts to date have not been fully treated as a coequal branch of 
government, a heightened burden must be met before a constitutional 
violation will be found.  By requiring a higher standard, the judicial system 
assures itself that any case of misconduct that meets that standard will likely 
get the attention of the other branches of Japanese government.223   
Under this standard for judicial review, the courts should weigh the 
public welfare against the principles of freedom and separation of religion, 
as the courts do in every case implicating constitutional rights.  Based on the 
preceding sections, proper considerations for the public welfare include 1) 
public safety, and 2) the improvement of civil society.  Freedom of religion 
and the separation of religion from the state are guided by 1) the threat of 
reestablishing a state religion, 2) whether the religious activity engaged in by 
the state works to the detriment of other religions, and 3) whether the 
government actor has denied other religions the opportunity to receive 
similar public benefits or recognition. 
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Weighing these factors, the courts should ask whether the plaintiffs 
have shown a probable threat to religious freedom by the state.  In answering 
these allegations, the state can defend by showing weaknesses in the 
plaintiffs’ arguments or by demonstrating that the public welfare outweighs 
any concerns raised by the plaintiffs.  In cases such as the Aum Shinrikyō 
Dissolution case, where the government totally disbands a religion, the 
plaintiffs will easily meet their burden and the government will necessarily 
have to demonstrate a strong countervailing threat to public safety.  But in 
other cases like Tsu City or SDF Enshrinement, where no religion has been 
denied a public benefit and no person has been prevented from exercising 
their faith, the government can argue that the plaintiffs failed to meet their 
burden, or easily defend by pointing to the public benefit supplied by such 
activities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The era of government intolerance of religion in Japan is over.  State 
Shintō is dead and religions no longer fear arbitrary dissolution or doctrinal 
revision by the hands of the state.  To cement these gains, the Japanese 
Constitution separates religion and state within the context of public welfare.  
However, the Constitution does not define the extent of this separation for 
the public welfare.  To resolve this ambiguity, many scholars have called for 
interpreting the Constitution to require strict separation.  But the Japanese 
Supreme Court has consistently held otherwise without providing any 
consistent indication as to the proper limits on separation.   
To resolve this issue, this comment has analyzed Articles 20 and 89 of 
Japan’s Constitution, and interpreted those articles in light of the intent 
behind their ratification and current public policy.  The result is an 
interpretation that narrowly construes the prohibitions of Articles 20 and 89 
so as to permit a broad degree of interaction between religion and the state 
for the continued benefit of Japan, while maintaining a vigilant watch for 
renewed disparate treatment of religions. 
